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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 77B-PROPERTY OF THE DEBToR.-
The debtor, a steamship company, had purchased seven steel cargo vessels from
the United States in 1928. The company paid part of price at the time of pur-
chase and agreed to pay the balance over a period of years. In 1929 the com-
pany contracted with the United States Shipping Board to carry ocean mail. In
1933 the company defaulted on the payment of installments. The Board arranged
to credit the amounts due for carrying to the unpaid purchase price. In January
1936 the company filed a petition for reorganization under Section 77B in the
bankruptcy court in the Western District of Washington. The petition was
approved on the same day and the debtor was authorized to carry on its busi-
ness. The Secretary of Commerce notified the debtor that the credit arrange-
ment of the Shipping Board had been rescinded. Before filing the petition the
debtor had notified the Post Office Department that certain voyages had been
completed. The debtor had demanded two sums each one over $14,000. The gov-
ernment officials refused to pay. The debtor then filed a petition setting out the
above facts and alleged that it must have the sums due on the 1935 contracts if
it was to continue in business. At the same time an order to show cause was
entered directing the sums to be paid or that the United States and certain
government officials appear before the court and show cause why the payments
should not be made. Special motions were filed by the United States and by the
officials concerned in which they objected to the jurisdiction of the court and in
which the individuals contended that they had never been served with process
in the particular district. The bankruptcy court denied the motion of the United
States to dismiss and directed all the defendants except the United States to pay
the accrued and the future earnings under the contract. On appeal, by leave of
the bankruptcy court, held, order reversed and the bankruptcy court ordered to
dismiss the petition against the United States and to set aside the service upon
the individuals; the claim to the fund already appropriated but still to be paid
out is not "property" of the debtor. United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co.,
86 F. (2d) 363 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936).
Under Section 77B (a) the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of the debtor
and its property wherever located. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (a)
(1936). In Continental Bank v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 Sup.
Ct. 595, 79 L.ed. 1110 (1935) the Supreme Court held that a similar provision
in Section 77 [47 STAT. 1474, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205 (a) (1933)] gave the bank-
ruptcy court with which the petition had been filed power to enjoin the sale
of pledged collaterals belonging to the debtor and held by creditors who resided
outside the district and who had not voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. In a proceeding under Section 77B the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Second Circuit upheld the power of the bankruptcy court in a New York
district to order a receiver appointed by a court in Georgia for properties
located in that state to turn those properties over to the trustees appointed for
the debtor by the New York bankruptcy court. In re Greyling Realty Corpora-
tion, 74 F. (2d) 734 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935). The court pointed out in that case
that the bankruptcy court must order notice of the hearing to be served in some
manner which will insure adequate protection to the party summoned. See also
In re Midland United Co., 12 F. Supp. 502 (D. Del. 1935); In re Norfolk
Weavers, 12 F. Supp. 494 (D. Del. 1935). The bankruptcy court in the Western
District of New York directed service to be made by trustees appointed for a
debtor in a 77B proceeding upon former directors and stockholders of the
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
debtor then resident in Michigan in an "independent suit" to recover misappro-
priated moneys, and the court denied the motions of the "defendants" to quash
the service. Thomas v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp. 839 (W.D.N.Y. 1935). The court
in the instant case did not approve of the decision in Thomas v. Winslow, supra.
The court in the principal case pointed out that the debtor or the debtor's trus-
tees might have to proceed by way of a plenary suit against adverse parties and
that the provision in Section 77B about jurisdiction would not help the primary
court in those cases. The court felt that the obligation in this particular case
was contractual even though the appropriation had been authorized.
In no one of these cases on jurisdiction under Section 77B was the question
of sanction considered. In the Rock Island case there was sanction behind the
order of the court in that the holders of the collaterals without further protest
would have to accept their position in the reorganization plan which the bank-
ruptcy court might confirm. But in a case like In re Greyling Realty Corporation,
supra, if the Georgia receiver would refuse to obey the order of the New York
bankruptcy court it would seem that any process such as citation and imprison-
ment for contempt would have to issue out of the Georgia federal court as an
ancillary bankruptcy court. The district in whih the petition has been filed
may not be that in which the reorganization can best be supervised but it is
with the discretion of that court if it has approved the petition to retain or
relinquish supervision providing of course that the debtor had its principal place
of business or its principal assets in the particular district during the greater part
of the preceding six months or was incorporated in the state of which the dis-
trict is a part. Hamilton Gas Co. v. Wafters, 75 F. (2d) 176 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935)
(where the creditors had filed a petition in one district and where the debtor
had filed a petition in another district in which the petition was first approved
and where the court held that the debtor may choose the district providing it
is one of those covered by the general jurisdiction provisions of the statute) ;
In re Hamilton Gas Co., 79 F. (2d) 97 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) (involving the same
debtor and where the appellate court directed the court which had first approved
the petition to dismiss the proceding because the debtor had neither its principal
place of business nor its principal assets in the particular district for the greater
part of the six month period preceding the filing of the petition) ; Hamilton Gas
Co. v .Watters, 79 F. (2d) 438 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935) (involving the same debtor
and where the appellate court affirmed the order approving the petition by that
court in which the creditors had first filed); see also In re Kelly-Springfield
Tire Co., 11 F. Supp. 839 (W.D.N.Y. 1935); cf. § 32 of the Bankruptcy Act,
'30 STAT. 554 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 55 (1926), and § 77B (a), supra ("* * * The
court shall upon petition transfer such proceedings to the territorial jurisdiction
where the interests of the parties will best be subserved. * * *).
VERNON X. MILLER.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FAIR TRADE ACT-RIGHT OF THE MANUFACTURER,
WHOLESALER, OR PRODUCER TO CONTROL THE RESALE PRICE OF TRADEMARKED OR
BRANDED CoMlMODITIEs.-These are two suits brought to enjoin the defendant
retailers from offering for sale and selling certain trademarked and branded
goods at less than the price fixed by the plaintiff wholesalers. The facts in the
two actions are similar. The State of Illinois has adopted the so-called Fair
Trade Act which, in effect, authorizes the producer, wholesaler, or manufacturer
of a trademarked or branded commodity which is in fair and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced by others to enter into
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